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In this paper, we estimate how quickly and how precisely a reactor’s operational status and thermal
power can be monitored over hour to month time scales, using the antineutrino rate as measured
by a cubic meter scale detector. Our results are obtained from a detector we have deployed and
operated at 25 meter standoff from a reactor core. This prototype can detect a prompt reactor
shutdown within five hours, and monitor relative thermal power to 3.5% within 7 days. Monitoring
of short-term power changes in this way may be useful in the context of International Atomic Energy
Agency’s (IAEA) Reactor Safeguards Regime, or other cooperative monitoring regimes.
PACS numbers: 89.30.Gg 28.41.-i
I. INTRODUCTION
The International Atomic Energy Agency uses an en-
semble of procedures and technologies, collectively re-
ferred to as the Safeguards Regime, to detect diversion
of fissile materials from civil nuclear fuel cycle facilities
into weapons programs. Nuclear reactors are a central
element of the nuclear fuel cycle and of the Safeguards
Regime. As we show here, it is possible and practical
to monitor the operational status and thermal power of
reactors with an antineutrino detector.
In the context of cooperative monitoring, an indepen-
dent measure of the reactor power can allow confirmation
of normal operation of the reactor without a physical in-
spection, and places a constraint on the total amount of
fissile material generated in a given period. The mea-
surement can also be used to verify the operator’s own
declarations of the reactor power and fuel burnup.
In an earlier paper [1], we presented a general method
for exploiting the high rate of antineutrinos emitted by
fission reactors to track the power and plutonium con-
tent of the reactor core in real time. Such monitoring
was first performed by a Russian group at a reactor in
Ukraine [2]. Recently, we presented first results from
a detector, “SONGS1”, developed to demonstrate this
method as a possible non-intrusive, remotely operated
safeguards tool [3]. SONGS1 has been acquiring data at
the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in
Southern California over the past two years. With it, we
have been able to confirm many of the important claims
made in [1]: non-intrusiveness with regard to core and
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site operations; continuous, remote and automatic data
collection and calibration; sensitivity to both short term
(several hour) and medium term (daily or weekly) reac-
tor power excursions; and sensitivity to changes in the
reactor fissile isotopic content.
In this paper, we quantify sensitivity of our prototype
to relative changes in the reactor power over hourly to
monthly time scales, using only the antineutrino signal.
Over these time scales, we show this sensitivity is limited
primarily by counting statistics even with a detector of
quite simple design.
The relevance of the measurement for reactor safe-
guards depends on the period over which the antineutrino
data is acquired. One can monitor the relative power on
an hourly basis and look for sudden outages or other
short-term anomalies in reactor operations. This type
of monitoring may be of interest for off-line refueled re-
actors, since a reactor outage allows the operator direct
access to the weaponizable fissile material in the core.
Alternatively, one can acquire data for week or month
long periods, and measure the average power in this pe-
riod with the higher precision afforded by the longer in-
tegration time. This more precise measurement can be
used to verify stable operations. For continuous mon-
itoring throughout a typical 12-24 month reactor cycle,
the month-to-month antineutrino rates must be corrected
to account for the influence of variations in the isotopic
content of the reactor fuel. This effect is analyzed in a
forthcoming companion paper.
It is important to emphasize that antineutrino-based
monitoring need not depend on operator declarations -
the detector can be kept under the control of the safe-
guards agency, providing a wholly independent measure-
ment of reactor status. The non-intrusive and contin-
uous nature of the antineutrino signal, the fact that it
provides quantitative information about the reactor ther-
2mal power and burnup, is under control of the safeguards
agency, and does not require frequent site visits, all point
to its potential utility for cooperative monitoring.
II. ANTINEUTRINO EMISSION FROM
NUCLEAR REACTORS
Antineutrino emission in nuclear reactors arises from
the beta decay of neutron-rich fragments produced by
heavy element fissions, and is thereby linked to the fissile
isotope production and consumption processes of interest
for reactor safeguards. On average, a fission is followed by
the production of approximately six antineutrinos. The
antineutrinos emerge from the core isotropically, and ef-
fectively without attenuation. Over the few MeV energy
range within which reactor antineutrinos are typically de-
tected, the average number of antineutrinos produced per
fission is significantly different for the two major fissile el-
ements, 235U and 239Pu. Hence, as the core evolves and
the relative mass fractions and fission rates of these two
elements change, the measured antineutrino flux in this
energy range will also change. This relation between the
fissile mass fractions and antineutrino flux, known as the
burnup effect, has been observed consistently in previous
experiments, e.g. [4].
For our present purpose it is useful to express the re-
lation between fuel isotopics and the antineutrino count
rate explicitly in terms of the reactor thermal power, Pth.
The thermal power is defined as
Pth =
∑
i
N
f
i ·Efi , (1)
where Nfi is the number of fissions per unit time for iso-
tope i, and Efi is the thermal energy released per fission
for this isotope. The sum runs over all fissioning isotopes,
with 235U, 238U, 239Pu, and 241Pu accounting for more
than 99% of all fissions.
For reactor power monitoring applications, it is impor-
tant to note that the thermal energy release per fission
E
f
i differs from the total energy release per fission, which
includes contributions Eν from the antineutrinos them-
selves, from neutron capture on fission products Enc,
and a time dependent term ∆Eβγ arising from beta and
gamma decays which have not completed by a given in-
stant in time. Fortunately, the neutron capture com-
ponent is readily calculable from instantaneous fission
product inventories, and the relative contribution from
decaying betas and gammas is small. As a result, the
thermal power is nearly proportional to the fission rate
as defined in equation 1. [5] calculates the ratio of these
terms to be Efi : Eν : ∆Eβγ : Enc ≃ 200 : 9 : 0.3 : 10
Following the formulation in [6], we define the power
fractions fi(t) contributed by each isotope as
fi(t) =
N
f
i (t) · Efi
Pth
. (2)
The antineutrino emission rate nν¯(t) can then be ex-
pressed in terms of the power fractions and the total ther-
mal power as:
nν¯(t) = Pth(t)
∑
i
fi(t)
E
f
i
∫
dEν¯φi(Eν¯), (3)
where the explicit time dependence of the fission fractions
and, possibly, the thermal power are noted. φ(Eν¯ ), is the
energy dependent antineutrino number density per MeV
and fission for the ith isotope. φ(Eν¯) has been measured
and tabulated by various authors, with recent summary
tables available in [6].
Equation 3 defines the burnup effect. The fission rates
N
f
i (t) and power fractions fi(t) change by several tens
of percent throughout a typical reactor cycle as 235U is
consumed and 239Pu produced and consumed in the core.
These changes directly affect the antineutrino emission
rate nν¯(t).
III. ANTINEUTRINO DETECTION THROUGH
INVERSE BETA DECAY INTERACTIONS
Reactor antineutrinos are normally detected via the
inverse beta decay process on quasi-free protons in hy-
drogenous scintillator. In this charged current interac-
tion, the antineutrino ν¯ converts the proton into a neu-
tron and a positron: ν¯+p→ e++n. For this process, the
cross section σ is small, with a numerical value of only
∼ 10−43cm2. The small cross section can be compen-
sated for with an intense source such as a nuclear reactor.
For example, cubic meter scale hydrogenous scintillator
detectors, containing ∼ 1028 target protons Np, will reg-
ister thousands of interactions per day at standoff dis-
tances of 10-50 meters from typical commercial nuclear
reactors.
In a measurement time T, the number of antineutrinos
detected via the inverse beta decay process is:
Nν¯(t) =
(
TNp
4πD2
)
Pth(t)
∑
i
fi(t)
E
f
i
∫
dEν¯σφiǫ. (4)
In the above equation, σ is the energy-dependent cross-
section for the inverse beta decay interaction, Np is the
number of target protons in the active volume of the de-
tector, and D is the distance from the detector to the
center of the reactor core. ǫ is the intrinsic detection effi-
ciency, which may depend on both energy and time. The
antineutrino energy density and the detection efficiency
are folded with the cross-section σ, integrated over all
antineutrino energies, and summed over all isotopes i to
yield the antineutrino detection rate.
To further clarify the relation between the thermal
power, the fuel burnup, and the antineutrino detection
rate, it is useful rewrite this equation as:
3Nν¯(t) = γ (1 + k(t))Pth(t), (5)
where γ is a constant encompassing all non-varying
terms, including the number of target protons, the de-
tector standoff distance, and the detection efficiency.
k(t) describes the change in the antineutrino flux due
to changes in the reactor fuel composition. γ is chosen
so that the value of k at the beginning of a reactor fuel
cycle is zero.
Typically, commercial reactors are operated at con-
stant thermal power. In this mode, k decreases by ≈ 0.1
over the course of a reactor fuel cycle, depending on the
initial fuel loading and operating history, i.e. the an-
tineutrino detection rate decreases by ≈ 10%. The mag-
nitude of this effect can be predicted at the few percent
level in an absolute sense, if the reactor fuel loading and
power history are known. Much of the uncertainty arises
from systematic shifts in measured antineutrino energy
densities φi(Eν¯), so that the relative uncertainty in the
predicted burnup rate can be considerably smaller.
IV. REACTOR SIMULATION
In order to study the relation between the reactor ther-
mal power and the measured antineutrino rate, we must
quantify the distorting effect of fuel burnup on the an-
tineutrino rate. For this purpose, we simulated the iso-
topic evolution of the SONGS core through a single fu-
eling cycle of the reactor, using the ORIGEN simulation
package [7]. ORIGEN benchmarking studies against as-
sayed fuel assemblies have shown that the package pre-
dicts the fissile isotopic content of Low Enriched Uranium
(LEU) fuel with 1-2% accuracy [8].
The input fuel loading per fuel assembly, the fuel as-
sembly power densities, and nominal cycle time were ob-
tained from the reactor operator. The assemblies were
simulated in ORIGEN and the fission rates, and mass
and number densities of the main fissile isotopes tracked
through a 590 full power day evolution, corresponding to
the length of Cycle 13 of the SONGS Unit 2 reactor. The
fission rates predicted by the simulation, folded with the
antineutrino spectral densities [6], allow us to estimate
the emitted antineutrino rate at any time during the cy-
cle. (Fig. 1a).
For the long cycles typical of the San Onofre plant,
the burnup effect causes a 10% decrease in detectable
antineutrinos by end of cycle. Cycle times have length-
ened over the last two decades as plant operations have
improved, with the result that the cumulative effect of
burnup on the antineutrino count rate is larger. How-
ever, the relevant point for the current analysis is that
the effect is small over the hour to month time scales of
interest for safeguards-related thermal power monitoring.
The effect of burnup is never greater than 0.62% over any
thirty day period (Fig. 1b). Provided that the detection
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FIG. 1: a) The predicted relative daily antineutrino emission
rate versus cycle day. The rate is normalized to its value
at the beginning of the cycle. b) The percent change in the
instantaneous antineutrino emission rate over the previous
thirty day period, versus cycle day.
efficiency, target mass and distance are constant, this fig-
ure demonstrates that the change in the quantity k(t) in
Equation 5 is small over month or shorter time scales, so
that the detected antineutrino rate is nearly proportional
to reactor power over these time intervals.
V. THE SONGS REACTOR
The SONGS1 detector is deployed at Unit 2 of SONGS.
There are two operational reactors at this station; both
are pressurized water reactors designed by Combustion
Engineering in the 1970s and have maximum thermal
(electric) power of 3.4 GWt (1.1 GWe). The detector
is located in the tendon gallery of Unit 2. A feature of
many commercial reactors, the tendon gallery is an annu-
lar concrete hall that lies beneath the walls of the reactor
containment structure. It is used to inspect and adjust
the tension in reinforcing steel cables known as tendons,
which extend throughout the concrete of the containment
structure. At SONGS these inspections occur every sev-
eral years, and involve the examination of only a handful
of representative tendons. Apart from these inspections,
the placement of the detector in the tendon gallery has
little or no impact on regular plant operations, and vice-
versa.
SONGS1 is located 24.5 ± 1.0 m from the Unit 2 reac-
tor core and 149 ± 3 m from that of Unit 3. The physical
core is well approximated by a 4 m tall cylinder with a
3.5 m diameter. Compared with a point source, its finite
4size has a less than 1% effect on the measured rate at the
24.5 m standoff distance of the SONGS1 detector.
Since the antineutrino flux generated by each core is
isotropic, 97% of the reactor antineutrinos reaching the
SONGS1 detector originate from Unit 2. With Unit 2 at
full power the antineutrino flux at the SONGS1 location
is 1017m−2s−1.
VI. THE SONGS1 DETECTOR
As described in detail elsewhere [3], the SONGS1 de-
tector consists of three subsystems; a central detector, a
passive shield, and a muon veto system. The central de-
tector consists of four identical stainless steel cells filled
with a total of 0.64 ± 0.06 tons of liquid scintillator. A
passive water/polyethylene shield for gamma rays and
neutrons surrounds the detector on six sides, with an av-
erage thickness of 0.5 m. A 2 cm thick plastic scintillator
envelope read out by PMTs covers five sides of the de-
tector and identifies cosmic ray muons.
In the central detector, positrons created by the inverse
beta process deposit energy via Bethe-Bloch ionization as
they slow in the scintillator. Annihilation with an elec-
tron yields two gamma rays which can deposit up to an
additional 1.022 MeV of energy in the detector. This set
of interactions, occuring within about 1 ns, is referred to
as the “prompt” energy deposition. The neutron carries
away a few keV of energy from the antineutrino interac-
tion. After thermalization, this neutron can be detected
by capture on a gadolinium (Gd) dopant. A concentra-
tion of 0.1% Gd by weight yields a neutron capture time
of 28 µs, and an 8 MeV energy release via a gamma ray
cascade resulting from the capture. The measured re-
sponse of the detector to this 8 MeV cascade is referred
to as the “delayed” energy deposition.
The time separation between prompt and delayed en-
ergy depositions follows an exponential distribution with
time constant equal to the 28 µs neutron capture time in
the Gd doped scintillator. Taken together, the prompt
and delayed energy depositions are referred to as a corre-
lated event. This refers to the fact that the same under-
lying physical process generates both interactions, and
that they occur close in time relative to most other pairs
of interactions taking place in the detector.
Correlated events can be created by mechanisms other
than inverse beta decay. For example, fast muogenic neu-
trons can scatter off protons in the scintillator, giving
a prompt energy deposition, and then be captured on
Gd with the same time distribution as occurs for inverse
beta events. Such events, which mimic the time struc-
ture of the antineutrino events, are referred to as cor-
related backgrounds. The detector also registers uncor-
related backgrounds - random coincidences between two
energy depositions from natural radionuclide decays and
other sources. Since the occurrence of such uncorrelated
backgrounds is governed by Poisson statistics, the time
separation between these events will also follow an ex-
ponential distribution, with a time constant equal to the
inverse of the single event rate (effectively the detector
trigger rate).
The detector trigger rate above a 1 MeV threshold, and
the trigger rate for the muon veto system are both ∼ 500
Hz. Data is acquired through a NIM/VME-based Data
Acquisition System and an on-site computer automati-
cally performs the data analysis. A telephone modem is
used to automatically retrieve the results of this analy-
sis, as well as detector state of health indicators, allow-
ing for the remote monitoring of detector operation, and,
through the antineutrino signal, of reactor operation.
The prototype SONGS1 system (which is not a highly
engineered design) operates unattended for months at a
time.
A. Expected Antineutrino Interaction Rate
With our current 0.64 ton liquid scintillator detector
at a standoff of 24.5 ± 1 m from the reactor core, and
with the reactor parameters defined in Sec. V, the rate
predicted by Eqn. 5 at the beginning of the reactor fuel
cycle (k(t) = 0) is 3800 ± 440 antineutrino interactions
per day for 100% detection efficiency. The uncertainty in
the absolute antineutrino rate arises primarily from the
uncertainty in our knowledge of the amount of scintillator
in the detector. This uncertainty is a systematic shift in
the absolute rate that has no effect on the relative power
measurements of interest in the analysis presented below.
VII. THE SELECTION PROCEDURE FOR
ANTINEUTRINO EVENTS
To isolate antineutrino events, we form candidate event
pairs from the raw data. For each pair of sequential
events meeting the hardware trigger criteria, the first is
labeled prompt or positron-like, and the second delayed
or neutron-like. Two time intervals are also defined: the
interval between the prompt event and the most recent
muon trigger or central detector trigger, and the time be-
tween the prompt and delayed events (interevent time).
To select antineutrino candidates we apply several cuts
to the sequential pairs. To exclude events with highly
non-uniform light collection, a cut is applied to ensure
that each PMT observing a particular cell sees a simi-
lar amount of light per event. For two PMTs observing
a given cell, a and b, the cut is applied to the ratio z,
defined as:
z =
a− b
a+ b
< 0.4. (6)
This selection criterion is referred to as the ratio cut.
In practice, it determines which interaction locations in
the scintillator are accepted by the selection process,
thereby defining a fiducial volume.
5TABLE I: The Antineutrino Event Selection Criteria
Quantity Criterion
Prompt Energy 2.39 MeV < Epositron < 9 MeV
Delayed Energy 3.5 MeV < Eneutron < 10 MeV
PMT Ratio Cut |z| < 0.4
Interevent Time tmin = 10 µs
Muon Veto tmu > 100 µs
Next, we apply cuts on the amount of energy recorded
in each cell. For simplicity and flexibility in our analysis,
we have chosen to consider each cell as an independent
detector.
Hardware limitations impose a cut of 10 µs on the min-
imum time between any event pair. Finally, we accept
only those events that occur at least 100 µs after the last
muon hit/acquisition trigger. This final cut significantly
reduces the number of contaminating antineutrino-like
event pairs in the data set caused by muon interac-
tions. From the empirically measured time constant of
the muon correlated events (20 µs), we calculate that
this cut excludes all but 0.7% of antineutrino-like back-
grounds correlated with a muon recorded in the veto.
Table I summarizes our event selection criteria. The
predicted rate of antineutrinos at beginning of cycle
based on these criteria is 407 ± 75 /day. As mentioned
earlier, this error includes the large absolute uncertainty
in the number of target atoms. As shown below, a rela-
tive measurement has a considerably smaller uncertainty.
VIII. THE ANTINEUTRINO-LIKE EVENT
SAMPLE
After applying these selection criteria, we examine the
spectrum of time intervals between pairs of successive en-
ergy depositions (Fig. 2). Two clear exponential features
are visible. The faster and more prominent of these arises
from a prompt, positron-like, energy deposition followed
a characteristic time later by a delayed, neutron capture-
like energy deposition. The second, slower exponential
is due to the random coincidence of two sequential back-
ground events both of which exceed the relevant thresh-
olds. As would be expected for such coincidences, the
time constant of this slow exponential is equal to the in-
verse of the acquisition trigger rate.
To further select antineutrino events we integrate the
interevent time distribution from 10 µs to 100 µs. Beyond
the upper time limit of 100 µs, the event sample is domi-
nated by uncorrelated backgrounds. This integral defines
the total number of events prior to any background sub-
traction, and includes contributions from true antineu-
trino interactions as well as both correlated and uncorre-
lated backgrounds. We refer to these as antineutrino-like
events.
It is impossible in this detector to distinguish back-
grounds from true antineutrino interactions on an event-
by-event basis. For the analysis below, when a net num-
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FIG. 2: A representative interevent time spectrum of event
pairs that pass all selection cuts acquired during 7 days of
data taking.
ber of antineutrino events is required, we perform a sta-
tistical subtraction of the same definite integral deter-
mined over a reactor off period. We use this procedure to
estimate the net daily or weekly number of antineutrinos.
For integration times less than 24 hours, unacceptably
large uncertainties are introduced by such a procedure
due to limited counting statistics. Instead, we apply a
standard hypothesis test to the total (non-background-
subtracted) antineutrino-like event rate to look for sig-
nifcant changes.
IX. HOURLY MONITORING OF THE
REACTOR OPERATIONAL STATUS
In the off-line refueled reactors which constitute the
majority of the world’s reactor stock under safeguards,
fissile materials can only be accessed during shutdowns.
Thus, it is of potential interest for safeguards to estimate
how quickly a shutdown or a large change in the reactor
thermal power can be identified using the antineutrino
signal.
For a quantitative estimate of the statistical signifi-
cance of such changes, the Sequential Probability Ratio
Test (SPRT) [9] can be used to estimate the amount of
time required to conclude, with a given level of confi-
dence, that the reactor thermal power has changed based
on a change in the antineutrino signal. The SPRT is
based on a log-likelihood ratio, defined as
rSPRT = log
P (µ1, nevents)
P (µ2, nevents)
. (7)
P (µ, nevents) is the probability that the measured num-
ber of events nevents is drawn from a parent distribution
with mean µ. µ1 and µ2 are the expected mean values
of the number of events in a fixed time interval during
periods at two different power levels - for example, 100%
6power and zero power. In the examples discussed below,
the expected mean values are derived from data taken
during periods in which the thermal power was known
by independent means to be at the level being tested
for (zero power, full power, or some intermediate value).
In a real regime, a set of calibrations between thermal
power and antineutrino rate would be established in an
initial cycle, and used at later times to specify mean val-
ues µ which would serve as inputs for the test statistic.
Using the test, measured mean values at any given time
would be tested against a set of possible expected values
derived from the earlier calibration. The length of the
calibration periods would be optimized based on the de-
tected antineutrino event rate, and the size of the burnup
effect for a given reactor and fuel type. With the con-
figuration discussed here, we used a calibration period of
one month, which gives ∼ 1% statistical accuracy on the
rate, compared with a < 0.65% systematic error induced
by burnup, as described earlier.
To apply the test, one calculates the cumulative sum of
the logarithmic quantity rSPRT , with the sum updated at
fixed intervals. Once this sum exceeds an upper or lower
bound a and b, the test has confirmed that the reactor
is in one and only one of the two possible states, with a
specified level of confidence. The statistic is then reset
and the testing process continues anew until a conclusion
is reached. This is referred to as ‘online’ testing, since the
test is constantly being updated with new data until a
decision is made, at which point the statistic is reset.
The probability for change detection can be directly
quantified in terms of a change in the test statistic. The
upper and lower thresholds are defined in terms of the
probability α of a false alarm, and probability β of a
false negative (i.e. failing to recognize the change of state
when it has occurred). The equations relating the thresh-
olds for the test statistic to the probabilities of detection
or non-detection are:
a = log
1− β
α
and b = log
1− α
β
.
The thresholds can be selected to balance the need for
timely detection with the need for high confidence in the
result. For the analysis below, we demand 1% probability
of either a false alarm or false negative.
Under a broad range of conditions, this method allows
one to detect a change in the status of a time-varying
process within the minimum possible time [9]. With the
SPRT method, one can also explicitly quantify the proba-
bility of false alarms (changes being detected where none
existed) and misses (undetected changes in operational
status) [10].
A simple implementation of the test assumes Poisson
distributed signal and background. We first confirm that
our data meet this criterion. Fig. 3 shows the histograms
of the number of detected antineutrino-like events in one
hour intervals for equal amounts of reactor on and re-
actor off data. Both distributions are reasonably well fit
by a Gaussian distribution, a good approximation for the
Poisson distribution even with these low counting statis-
tics. The chi-squared per degree of freedom values for
the Gaussian fits are 0.9 and 1.1 for the on and off data
respectively. As seen in the figure, there is significant
overlap in the distributions, so that a single measurement
is insufficient to determine the operational status.
FIG. 3: A histogram of the number of antineutrino-like events
per hour interval before (black) and during (light gray) the
reactor outage.
In our first example, the outage occurs within one hour
(Fig. 4a), and the test requires about 5 hours of data to
determine that the reactor has turned off, with 1% prob-
ability of either a false alarm or false negative (missed
alarm) (Fig. 4b). This condition is satisfied when the
value of the test statistic is smaller than b = −4.59.
In another excursion, the reactor was ramped from zero
to 80% power over an ∼14 hour period, and held at this
level for 3 days (Fig. 5a). In this case, the test requires 2
hours to determine that the reactor is in fact in the 80%
power state, with 99% confidence. (Fig. 5b).
A somewhat more challenging circumstance is pre-
sented by a subsequent transition from 80% to 100% ther-
mal power. In this case, it is difficult to see the power
step by direct inspection of the change in the number of
antineutrino-like events (Fig. 6a). However, the SPRT
is able to detect the change with 99% confidence, albeit
with a longer time to detect due to the closer proxim-
ity of the mean number of antineutrino-like events in the
80% and 100% power states. The test is able to detect
the 20% power shift in approximately twelve hours.(Fig.
6b).
X. DAILY AND WEEKLY MONITORING OF
RELATIVE THERMAL POWER
Hourly monitoring can quickly detect gross changes
in the operational state of the reactor, such as the 20%
power shift just described. For more precise measure-
ments, longer integration times are required. We define
a relative thermal power estimator by forming the ra-
tio of the daily or weekly average antineutrino detection
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FIG. 4: (a): the hourly number of antineutrino-like events,
plotted versus hour, through a reactor outage. (b): the value
of the SPRT statistic plotted versus hour over the same time
range. The dashed lines in this figure are the 99 % confidence
level values of the test statistic. In both plots, the vertical line
indicates the hour in which the reactor shutdown occurred.
Values of the statistic above the upper dashed indicate that
the reactor is in the on state. For this data set, these values
are obtained only during the reactor on period, meaning that
no false positives or negatives occurred.
rate (after background subtraction)to the prior month
background-substracted average rate. This ratio is pro-
portional to the daily or weekly average of the thermal
power, with an accuracy to be calculated below. As-
suming the thermal power of the reactor to be known
by independent means at the start of a month-long mea-
surement period, the antineutrino rate can thereby be
directly associated with a particular power level, and ex-
cursions from this level can be detected by changes in the
daily or weekly average
Month-long periods of comparison form a natural
break point for the analysis presented here. This is due
to the fact that the effect of burnup on the detected (and
emitted) antineutrino rate never exceeds 0.65% over one
month, as demonstrated in section IV, while statistical
uncertainty is at the 1% level for this averaging period.
As long as the period of comparison is no longer than
one month, we will show that the variation in the ra-
tio just defined will be dominated by counting statistics,
and not by burnup-induced changes or other systematic
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FIG. 5: (a): the hourly number of antineutrino-like events,
plotted versus hour, through a reactor ramp from zero to
80% power. (b): the value of the SPRT statistic plotted ver-
sus hour over the same time range. The dashed lines have
significance analogous to those in Fig. 4.
effects. For longer comparison periods, the effect of bur-
nup on the relative power estimate grows, and we must
explicitly introduce our burnup model. This analysis is
performed separately in a forthcoming paper.
The precision of the daily or weekly estimator is deter-
mined by counting statistics, and by any time-dependent
systematic effects (other than burnup) which can alter
the detection efficiency. By making the measurement
relative to an initial monthly average value, time inde-
pendent corrections to the detection rate - such as those
caused by an incorrect estimate of the number of tar-
gets or of the overall detection efficiency - only induce an
overall shift in the constant of proportionality between
reactor power and the absolute antineutrino detection
rate. This shift has no effect on the stability or precision
of our relative power estimator.
To analyze the correlation between the daily and
weekly average antineutrino detection rate and the ther-
mal power, we must subtract the background, which is
measured during reactor off periods.
A. Reactor Off Data
During a 63 day period with Unit 2 (the near reactor)
at 0% power, the average daily rate of events passing all
antineutrino selection criteria was 441 (Fig. 7). This rate
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FIG. 6: (a): the hourly number of antineutrino-like events,
plotted versus hour, through a reactor ramp from 80% to
100% power. (b): the value of the SPRT statistic plotted
versus hour over the same time range. The dashed horizontal
lines have significance analogous to those in the lower plot in
Fig. 4. The solid vertical line shows the hour in which 100%
thermal power was obtained.
is primarily comprised of uncorrelated non-antineutrino
backgrounds (as well as an ∼10 count per day contribu-
tion of real antineutrinos from the distant reactor). The
measured standard deviation for the reactor off data sam-
ple is 22.3 events, or 5%, (with an uncertainty in this
standard deviation value of 0.5%). The predicted uncer-
tainty due to Poisson counting statistics alone is 4.7%,
consistent with the measured standard deviation value.
We also performed a Gaussian fit to the data as a check
on the measured sample mean and standard deviation.
The value of the Gaussian mean is 435 events, close to the
sample mean, and the Gaussian sigma is 20 events, close
to the sample standard deviation value of 22.3 events.
Over the same 63 day (reactor off) interval, the average
weekly rate of events passing all antineutrino selection
criteria was 3088, with a measured standard deviation of
88 events, or 2.6 ± 0.5%. The predicted Poisson uncer-
tainty based on counting statistics in this case is 1.9%,
close to the sample standard deviation, but indicative
of a possible small additional uncertainty not accounted
for by counting statistics. The Gaussian mean (3088)
and standard deviation (87) are also close to the sample
mean and standard deviation.
For both daily and weekly integration times, the mean
value of the background is subtracted from the signal
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FIG. 7: A histogram of events passing all antineutrino selec-
tion cuts during a 63 day long reactor off period.
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FIG. 8: Events per day passing all antineutrino selection cuts
during a 63 day long reactor off period, plotted versus day.
during reactor on periods to obtain the net antineutrino
detection rate.
A linear fit to reactor off daily antineutrino-like de-
tection rate plotted versus day (Figure 8) has a slope of
0.13± 0.15, consistent with a constant background.
B. The Stability of the Antineutrino-Based Power
Estimate
Next we consider the stability of a relative power
measurements based on the daily and weekly average
background-subtracted antineutrino detection rate. Ac-
cording to operator records, the reactor power in our
analysis period is constant to within 0.5%, at 99.5% of
full power.
Rearranging Equation 3 it can be seen that the thermal
power depends on the measured number of antineutrino
events per unit of time, divided by the detector related
constant γ:
9Pth =
Nν¯
γ(1 + k(t))
(8)
We define a relative power measurement r as
r =
< Pth >day,week
< Pth >month
(9)
The brackets and subscript indicate averaging for the
previous day, week or month. The small systematic vari-
ation between the daily or weekly value of k and its
monthly average can be neglected, and the term γ, de-
pending on the detector mass and distance, is assumed
constant. With better than 1% precision, the variation
in the ratio now depends only on the statistical varia-
tions in the count rates, averaged over the periods in
question. However, this neglects possible time variations
in the detection efficiencies over the relevant time inter-
val. If these variations are large, the measured standard
deviation of the data will be larger than the
√
nevents
spread expected from Poisson counting statistics alone.
We consider this possibility directly.
With the above assumptions, the ratio r can be ex-
pressed in terms of the ratio of average detected antineu-
trino rates as:
r =
< Nν¯ >day,week
< Nν¯ >month
, (10)
where the subscripted brackets again signify averaging
over the indicated time periods.
Fig. 9 shows the spread in this ratio for daily and
weekly averaging. By examining the standard deviation
of r , we can quantify the degree to which the ratio obeys
Poisson statistics, and estimate the contribution of non-
Poisson, time-varying systematic drifts on the relative
power estimate.
For the daily averaged data, the measured standard
deviation in the ratio r is 8.3±0.5%, while the spread
based on a gaussian fit is 8.0±0.5%. These values are
within error of the 7.8% expected spread in the ratio r
due to Poisson statistics alone. For the weekly data,the
measured standard deviation in r is 3.0±0.3% - again
consistent with the expected 3% variation due to Poisson
statistics.
For both daily and weekly averaging, statistical uncer-
tainty fully accounts for the total observed spread in the
ratio. Aside from the known ≤ 0.65% systematic contri-
bution to the spread due to burnup, such small additional
effects as are present may come from periodic drifts in the
gain scale, or other efficiency changes that are not fully
accounted for in the calibration procedure.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
The above analysis demonstrates that our current pro-
totype detector can monitor changes in reactor status
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FIG. 9: The histograms of the ratio of r, defined as the net
daily or weekly average detected antineutrino rate to the net
detected antineutrino rate averaged over the 28 days prior to
the measurement. Both the daily and weekly data sets extend
over the same 33 week period.
(on versus off) in five hours with greater than 99% confi-
dence, and can directly measure power levels over month
long time scales with an estimated 8.3% precision us-
ing a daily background subtracted number of detected
antineutrinos, or 3% using a weekly number, limited al-
most entirely by statistics. By construction, this estimate
is independent of the long term ≃ 12% systematic trend
induced by the changing core isotopics. It provides a
measure of the precision of the detector itself, including
all statistical and systematic effects occurring over peri-
ods of days to months. Slightly longer integration times,
or improvements in the detection efficiency would further
reduce this uncertainty. Ultimately, however, the effect of
burnup must be fully accounted to extract a stable long
term power or burnup measurement beyond one month.
This analysis is the subject of a separate article.
The fact that our current detector approaches the Pois-
son limit for a relative power measurement on day to
week time scales has further significance. It implies that
even a simple detector design can suffice for the relative
thermal power monitoring approach envisioned here. Our
experience is that the simplicity of the detector design
will play a key, even decisive role in determining whether
this technology is adopted by the IAEA or other safe-
guards regimes.
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